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MAIL COVERS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
UNITED STA TES v. CHOA4 TE
In United States v. Choate,I the Ninth Circuit held that a mail cover 2
is not an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution.3 The majority of the
court recognized that the reasonableness of the mail cover procedure is
to be measured by the criteria set forth in Katz v. United States,4 but
did not find that an addressee seeks privacy with respect to the outside
cover of his mail or that such an expectation would be reasonable.
I. INTRODUCTION
A mail cover is a surveillance of an addressee's mail conducted by
postal employees at the request of law enforcement officials.5 While
not expressly permitted by federal statute, a mail cover is authorized by
postal regulations in the interest of national security and crime preven-
tion,6 and permits the recording of all information appearing on the
outside cover of all classes of mail.7 Under the regulations, the Chief
1. 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 350 (1978).
2. The mail cover procedure is defined in 39 C.F.R. § 233.2(c)(1) (1977) as follows:
"Mail cover" is the process by which a record is made of any data appearing on the
outside cover of any class of mail matter, including checking the contents of any sec-
ond-, third-, or fourth-class mail matter as now sanctioned by law, in order to obtain
information in the interest of (i) protecting the national security, (ii) locating a fugitive,
or (iii) obtaining evidence of commission or attempted commission of a crime.
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
4. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The test was stated in Katz by Justice Harlan in his concurring
opinion: "My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is
a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable'." Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
5. Mail covers are originally authorized for 30 days, but may be renewed upon request
prior to the termination of the preceding period for 30-day periods not to exceed a total of
120 days, unless further extension is personally approved by the Chief Postal Inspector. 39
C.F.R. § 233.2(f)(4)-(5) (1977).
6. See note 8 infra for text of 39 C.F.R: § 233.2(d)(2)(ii) (1977).
7. The federal regulations do not specify what data may be recorded. Such information
would appear to include the name and address of the addressee, the postmark (date and
city), the name and address of the sender, and the class and nature of the article. In Choate's
case, the information included a listing of the addressee, address (three locations were cov-
ered), sender, return address, place and date of postmark, and class of mail. 576 F.2d at 187
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Postal Inspector or his designee is permitted to order a mail cover when
there is reason to suspect that the subject of the cover is violating a
postal statute, or upon written request from a law enforcement agency
where reasonable grounds for institution of the cover are specified. A
mail cover may be authorized for a broad investigatory purpose9 or as
part of the investigation of a single suspect as long as the postal inspec-
tor in charge is satisfied that the subject has committed or is attempting
to commit a felony.10
Since a thirty-day mail cover yields a great deal of information about
an addressee which would otherwise remain private,"' the use of mail
covers by federal and state law enforcement agencies clearly raises the
constitutional question of whether a mail cover constitutes a reasonable
(Hufstedler, L, concurring in part and dissenting in part). A mail cover also includes a
physical inspection of the contents of second, third, and fourth class mail. 39 C.F.R.
§ 233.2(c)(1) (1977).
8. 39 C.F.R. § 233.2(d) (1977) reads as follows:
Authorizations-Chief Postal Inspector. (1) The Chief Postal Inspector is the princi-
pal officer of the Postal Service in the administration of all matters governing mail
covers. He may delegate any or all authority in this regard to not more than two desig-
nees at Inspection Service Headquarters. Except for national security mail covers, he
may also delegate any or all authority to the Regional Chief Postal Inspectors. All such
delegations of authority shall be issded through official directives.
(2) The Chief Postal Inspector, or his designee, may order mail covers under the
following circumstances:
(i) When he has reason to believe the subject or subjects of the mail cover are en-
gaged in any activity violative of any postal statute.
(ii) When written request is received from any law enforcement agency wherein the
requesting authority stipulates and specifies the reasonable grounds that exist which
demonstrate the mail cover is necessary to (A) protect the national security, (B) locate a
fugitive, or (C) obtain information regarding the commission or attempted commission
of a crime.
(iii) Where time is of the essence, the Chief Postal Inspector, or his designee, may
act upon an oral request to be confirmed by the requesting authority in writing within 2
business days. However, no information shall be released until an appropriate written
request is received.
9. See United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958
(1976) (mail cover authorized for the recording of information appearing on the outside
cover of all letters mailed from Switzerland to New York bearing specific postage meter
marks, lacking return addresses, and addressed to any recipient). Leonard is discussed in
text accompanying notes 136 through 142 infra.
10. 39 C.F.R. § 233.2(c)(3) (1977) states: "'Crime,' for purposes of these regulations, is
any commission of an act or the attempted commission of an act that is punishable by law
by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year."
11. A watch of the cover of mail could reveal information about where the subject banks
and shops, his physicians, creditors, accountants, property interests, religious, political and
educational affiliations, publications to which he subscribes, and the identity of personal
correspondents. The only correspondent exempted from a mail cover is the subject's attor-
ney whose identity must be known in advance and communicated to the Postal Service
pursuant to 39 C.F.R. § 233.2(0(2) (1977). Presumably, other legal correspondence would
be subject to recordation. See 576 F.2d at 187 & n.13 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
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governmental intrusion on individual privacy rights. It can be argued
that although information appearing on the outside cover of first-class
mail is in plain view to postal personnel, it is implicit in the nature of
the postal system that such information is to be used for the limited
purpose of moving the mail. 2 Thus, as Judge Hufstedler asserted in
the Choate dissent, a mail cover and the data taken from the surface of
mail may be a warrantless search and seizure in violation of the fourth
amendment. 1
3
II. HISTORY OF THE CASE
In 1971, Dennis Choate was under investigation by the Bureau of
Narcotics Enforcement (BNE) for suspected drug dealing. The BNE
investigation yielded insufficient evidence in connection with the sus-
pected offense and the file was closed. The BNE report was then
turned over to the Federal Bureau of Customs, which reopened the in-
vestigation of Choate in 1972. The thrust of this new inquiry was to
determine if Choate's assets coincided with the amount of narcotics he
was suspected of importing. In this connection, a mail cover of his in-
coming correspondence at three addresses was sought. Since Choate
was suspected of obtaining drugs from South America, it was expected
that a mail cover would reveal, inter alia, his South American source. 14
12. The basic function of the Postal Service is established in 39 U.S.C. § 101(a) (1976):
The Postal Service shall have as its basic function the obligation to provide postal serv-
ices to bind the Nation together through the personal, educational, literary, and busi-
ness correspondence of the people. It shall provide prompt, reliable, and efficient
services to patrons in all areas and shall render postal services to all communities.
13. 576 F.2d at 189 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting). See Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also notes 65-67 infra and accompanying text. See generally,
Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 133.
14. The body of the letter requesting the mail cover read as follows:
The above listed subject is currently under investigation by this office for the suspected
smuggling of large quantities of narcotics into the United States. CHOATE is currently
organizing a large narcotic smuggling ring with the primary source located in South
America. It is felt that CHOATE and the source in South America correspond by mail.
Return addresses on mail received at the above addresses would be of aid in identifying
the source in South America and other members of the smuggling ring. It is requested
that a mail cover be placed at the above addresses for a period of 30 days. It is further
requested that all replies be directed to Special Agent Lynn P. Williams.
Smuggling narcotics into the United States is in violation of Title 21 USC 952 and
carries a penalty under Title 21 USC 960(a)(1) of 15 years imprisonment or a fine of
$25,000 and/or both. CHOATE is not under indictment as a result of any investigation
conducted by this office nor does this office have any knowledge of any other indict-
ments pending against CHOATE. It is believed that CHOATE has retained Sherman
& Sturman, Attorneys at Law, 8500 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 908, Beverly Hills, California
as legal counsel.
576 F.2d at 169.
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A thirty-day cover was authorized and conducted, but produced no
return addresses from outside the United States. 15 However, it did re-
veal the location of Choate's personal bank account and the identity of
two creditors. From these sources, the Customs Bureau was able to
obtain information about Choate's expenditures which was ultimately
turned over to the Internal Revenue Service.16 The IRS launched its
own investigation based on that information, 7 which resulted in
Choate's indictment on two counts of filing false income tax state-
ments. 8 Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress all evidence
against him on the grounds that it was obtained by reason of an illegal
search.'9 The district court held that the mail cover had been con-
ducted in violation of Choate's fourth amendment rights and granted
defendant's motion.2" On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and re-
manded for trial.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING
In Choate, the majority found that the mail cover placed on the de-
fendant was neither illegal under applicable postal regulations nor a
violation of any constitutionally protected right.2' Prior to its discus-
15. Id at 188 n.19 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
16. Id at 185.
17. Id
18. Shortly after the indictment was returned, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
indictment on the ground it was the result of impermissibly discriminatory law enforcement.
The motion was granted. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial.
See United States v. Choate, 527 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1975).
19. Defendant's original argument was that in addition to the illegality of the mail cover,
a government informant's burglary of his house constituted an illegal search and a bank
statement taken at that time was, therefore, illegally seized. The district court found that the
primary illegality did not taint the evidence in more than a de minimus manner since infor-
mation contained in the bank statement did not lead to any evidence against the defendant,
United States v. Choate, 422 F. Supp. 261, 263 (C.D. Cal. 1976). As to this issue, the district
court's ruling was unanimously affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. 576 F.2d at 170, 186 (Huf-
stedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
20. 422 F. Supp. at 270. The district court, relying on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), held that the mail cover invaded Choate's reasonable expectation of privacy. It
found (1) that although it is understood that the information on the outside cover of mail is
available to postal employees, a reasonable person expects that such information will be
used in a mechanical fashion solely for postal purposes and operations, and (2) that there is
no extraordinary governmental interest justifying a mail cover's incursion into the realm of
privacy. 422 F. Supp. at 270-71.
21. Citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the majority noted that protection
of a general right to privacy is left largely to the states; that a personal right of privacy may
not enjoy constitutional protection unless it is rooted in a specific constitutional provision;
and that "[t]he specific sources for zones of privacy in the Constitution seem only to include
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments." 576 F.2d at 173. Since neither the
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sion of the primary constitutional issue, the court focused on whether
the mail cover on Choate reasonably complied with postal regulations.
third nor fifth amendments had been raised by the defendant at the trial level, the majority
dismissed the applicability of the third amendment by an ipse dixit. Nor did the court con-
sider the fifth amendment since the defendant conceded that the information revealed by the
mail cover derived from an inspection of mail still under the senders' control and, according
to the court, defendant did not have standing to raise the senders' constitutional rights. 576
F.2d at 174 & n.8. But see notes 127 & 128 infra and accompanying text. In holding that a
mail cover does not violate the ninth amendment, the court stated that privacy rights based
on the ninth amendment have involved family and procreational activities "'so basic and
fundamental and so deeply rooted in our society' to be truly 'essential rights,' and which...
cannot find direct support elsewhere in the Constitution." 576 F.2d at 181 (citing Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)). Since "necessary
aids to criminal investigation, such as mail covers" do not involve such matters they are not
covered by the ninth amendment. 576 F.2d at 181.
The majority did not fully address the first amendment issues raised by the use of mail
covers since the district court opinion did not rely on a first amendment argument and the
amici briefs relied principally on the fourth amendment. It further dismissed the possibility
that a mail cover may implicate the first amendment by stating that no first amendment
rights of defendant were violated. Id at 180-81.
However, it appears that the imposition of a mail cover potentially implicates the first
amendment rights of an addressee in three ways: (1) a recipient of mail has an independent
first amendment right to receive information (Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)); (2) a recipient's free
associational rights may be affected by the imposition of a mail cover (Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958)); and (3) a recipient's freedom of expression may be inhibited when he refrains from
communicating with correspondents in order to reduce the effect of the mail cover (Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)).
Whether a mail cover interferes with an addressee's first amendment right to receive infor-
mation is arguable since the mail cover procedure does not unduly delay or prevent the
addressee's receipt of his mail (see Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 897 (1967); United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 937 (1958)). However, if a sender refrains from corresponding with an addressee
solely because of an outstanding mail cover, the recipient's right to receive information is
clearly affected.
Similarly, an addressee's first amendment associational rights are chilled by the imposi-
tion of a mail cover when a sender, aware of the mail cover in effect on the addressee,
refrains from associating with the addressee by mail. Even if, as in Choate, a sender is not
aware of the existence of the mail cover, subsequent contact with the sender by law enforce-
ment personnel affects the addressee's future association with the sender long after the mail
cover has been discontinued. Citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), the majority
stated that "the practice of associating with compatriots in crime is not a protected associa-
tional right." 576 F.2d at 181. Although the mail cover on Choate was originally requested
in order to help identify an alleged South American criminal connection, the information
obtained was actually the identity of the Bank of America, Carte Blanche, and Diner's Club,
hardly Choate's "compatriots in crime."
Because the mail cover only revealed information taken from the outside of envelopes, the
majority found no abridgement of Choate's freedom of speech. Id. However, any chill on
this right occurs prior to the time incoming letters are subject to recordation; it occurs when
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A. Did the Cover of Choate's Mail Reasonably Comply with Postal
Regulations?
In analyzing the Bureau of Customs request for the mail cover, the
Ninth Circuit noted that the postal regulations that authorize the mail
cover procedure 22 require only that the requesting authority "stipulate
and specify the reasonable grounds" that demonstrate the necessity for
the mail cover.23 The majority found that this requirement was easily
satisfied since Choate had been under investigation for narcotics smug-
gling and the requesting letter stated that fact.24 However, the defend-
ant claimed that the statements in the letter were inaccurate for two
reasons. First, although the requesting letter asserted that the mail
cover was necessary to identify Choate's narcotics source, the Bureau of
Customs agent testified that the inquiry was actually aimed at tracing
Choate's assets rather than identifying an alleged South American con-
nection.25 Next, defendant asserted that the agent erroneously indi-
cated that Choate was currently suspected of federal narcotics
violations when, in fact, the agent had no current knowledge in that
regard but had based his statement on a year-old report in the closed
Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement file.
26
The majority was not persuaded by these arguments. It found that
even if the Bureau of Customs were attempting to trace assets, it did so
the addressee himself refrains from expressing ideas in correspondence so as to reduce re-
turn communication subject to the mail cover.
The majority recognized that first amendment associational rights of senders may be im-
plicated by the use of mail covers, but indicated that these rights could not be raised by
Choate. Id However, even when an addressee is foreclosed from asserting his own first
amendment rights in attacking a mail cover, it appears that the assertion of the senders'
rights pursuant to the exception announced in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-57
(1953) would be possible since (1) the addressee has sustained injury in connection with the
mail cover, (2) there is a clear connection between the senders and the addressee, and (3) it
would be impossible for senders to make the constitutional claim when their own rights have
not been injured. For a more detailed discussion of this exception see notes 127 & 128 infra
and accompanying text.
The United States Supreme Court has recently emphasized, that when first amendment
rights are implicated, "the requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with
'scrupulous exactitude.' . . . Where presumptively protected materials are sought to be
seized, the warrant requirement should be administered to leave as little as possible to the
discretion or whim of the officer in the field." Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970,
1981 (1978), citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 458 (1965). This would seem to require
a careful scrutiny of the mail cover procedure in light of the obvious first amendment issues
raised by the use of this law enforcement aid.
22. See note 8 supra.
23. 39 C.F.R. § 233.2(d)(2)(ii) (1977).
24. See note 14 supra.
25. 576 F.2d at 194 & n.38 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
26. Id at 193.
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as a continuation of the narcotics investigation.27 The majority also
believed it inappropriate to "impugn the truthfulness" of the Bureau of
Customs agent since neither the district judge nor defendant on appeal
questioned his veracity and because the record could be read consist-
ently with the contents of the letter.2"
In granting defendant's motion to suppress, the district court had
held that the agent's letter to the postal inspector failed to specify rea-
sonable grounds for conducting the cover.29 In the letter, the agent
stated: "It is felt that CHOATE and the source in South America corre-
spond by mail."30 The district judge believed that an agent's mere
"feeling" that criminal .activity was afoot was not sufficient to satisfy
the postal regulations.3' In reversing the district court, however, the
Ninth Circuit majority viewed the requesting letter, which had been
drafted by a non-lawyer, in a "practical and not abstract. . . common-
sense and realistic fashion."32 It stated that the request satisfied the
postal regulations because "hypertechnical niceties should not be ap-
plied to this mail cover request."
33
Dissenting to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, Judge Hufstedler felt
that the requesting letter failed to satisfy the postal regulations. She
believed that the letter contained numerous misrepresentations 34 and
that the results 'of the cover were not used for the purpose specified.35
27. 576 F.2d at 173.
28. Id
29. United States v. Choate, 422 F. Supp. 261, 266-67 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
30. Id at 264 n.5 (emphasis added).
31. Id at 266.
32. 576 F.2d at 173.
33. Id
34. Id at 193-94 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Hufstedler stated
each material representation in the request was false and known to be false by [the
Customs agent] at the time it was made. It was a bare-faced abuse of the mail cover
procedure to obtain information and pursue an investigation apparently outside [the
customs agent's] jurisdiction-asset tracing to establish a basis for an IRS prosecu-
tion-by reciting false material facts which, if true, would logically have justified sur-
veilance.
Id at 194.
35. Id at 209. Judge Hufstedler found that even if a search warrant is not required for
mail covers, the "search" of Choate's mail was unreasonable under the fourth amendment
"because the scope of the search unreasonably exceeded the purpose which justified it." Id
Because the results of the mail cover were not used for the purpose specified in the re-
questing letter, the district court also deemed the mail cover a general search, "regarded as
inherently unreasonable and. . .particularly offensive to the Constitution." 422 F. Supp. at
268 n.12 (citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (fourth amendment requires
that warrants particularly describe the thing to be seized, makes general searches impossible,
and prohibits the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing a different thing)). The
district judge distinguished the circumstances surrounding the mail cover in Lustiger v.
United States; 386 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (wherein a mail
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Specifically, she observed that the request contained three material
misrepresentations in that the customs agent possessed insufficient in-
formation to support the statements (1) that Choate was currently or-
ganizing a narcotics smuggling ring with a South American source, (2)
that he corresponded with that source and (3) that the mail cover would
aid in identifying the source.36 She stated that such intentional and
material misrepresentations rendered the mail cover request illegal in
the same way that "intentional misstatement of material facts in an affi-
davit by a government agent serves to vitiate a search warrant. .. .
She further noted that the facts in the request were inconsistent with a
surveillance of all of the defendant's domestic mail if the Bureau of
Customs was in fact seeking only the identity of a South American
correspondent.38
The majority did not address the argument that the scope of the
cover unreasonably exceeded the reasons advanced for its justification.
It reasoned that the requesting letter clearly satisfied the regulations
because it was replete with "reasonable grounds" to conduct the cover
and that too strict an interpretation of the regulations was, therefore,
neither required nor necessary. It dismissed any factual deficiencies in
the letter by stating: "The regulations. . . do not require the specifica-
tion of the factual predicate upon which the requesting agency basis
[sic] its conclusion that the. . . subject is involved in the commission
. . . of a crime."
39
B. Does the Mail Cover Procedure Violate the Fourth Amendment?
The United States Supreme Court has not yet dealt with the issue of
cover was found to comply reasonably with postal regulations), from those surrounding the
cover of Choate's mail. In Lusiger, "the mail cover was limited to a particular post office
box where all mail received was related to a scheme already under investigation; here, a
general search of all envelopes was undertaken." 422 F. Supp. at 268 (footnotes omit-
ted)(emphasis in original).
36. 576 F.2d at 193-94 (Hufstedler, L, concurring and dissenting).
37. Id at 194.
38. Id at 209. Cf. Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971). In Piazzola, defend-
ants were arrested after a search of their dormitory rooms, conducted pursuant to a univer-
sity regulation, revealed the presence of narcotics. The Fifth Circuit held that a university
regulation authorizing entry into student rooms for purposes of making a search, although
reasonable when the search is in furtherance of the university's function as an educational
institution, is an impermissible invasion of privacy when the search is used solely to acquire
criminal evidence. Superimposing Piazzola on Choate, the "search" of the cover of mail
may be reasonable as long as it is limited to the purpose identified in the request or the
purpose of moving the mail, but when used to obtain criminal evidence, the procedure vio-
lates the fourth amendment.
39. 576 F.2d at 172.
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whether mail covers violate the fourth amendment, although the con-
stitutionality of mail covers has recently been challenged in two cir-
cuits ° In the early cases dealing with the issue, circuit courts did not
engage in any fourth amendment analysis, but upheld the legality of
the mail covers on the ground that they did not violate postal statutes
prohibiting the obstruction, detention, or delay of the mails.4 In light
of Katz v. United States,42 the Ninth Circuit in Choate was required to
analyze the mail cover procedure in terms of the fourth amend-
ment-whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
as to the information on the surface of his mail, and whether such ex-
pectation was violated.
1. Prior Case History
The first case in which a mail cover was challenged as a violation of
postal statutes was United States v. Costello.43 There, the Second Cir-
cuit relied on Ex Parte Jackson,44 in which the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the sending
of lottery information through the mail. In Ex Parte Jackson, the
Supreme Court drew a distinction between sealed mail matter and mat-
ter open for inspection in determining which articles of mail could be
examined in enforcing the statute.45 The Court stated that
letters and sealed packages ... in the mail are as fully guarded from
40. See United States v. Bianco, 534 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 822
(1977); United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958
(1976); United States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953
(1971). These cases are discussed in text accompanying notes 134-147 infra.
41. The applicable postal statutes are found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1703 (1976).
42. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also notes 107-09 infra and accompanying text.
43. 255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958). Costello was convicted on
three counts of tax evasion. His motion for a new trial was based upon a claim of newly
discovered evidence showing, among other things, that the fruits of an allegedly illegal mail
cover had been used at- his trial. In affirming the lower court's denial of the motion, the
court of appeals found that while some delay of defendant's mail was probable, it was very
limited, and that there was never a delay of more than one delivery. That delay did not
come within the proscription of 18 U.S.C. § 1701, which makes it a crime for anyone to
"knowingly and willfully" obstruct or retard the passage of the mail. Also, since nothing
more was done to the letters than to record the information on the outside of the envelopes
while they were within the post office, the court did not believe that there had been any
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1702, which makes it a crime for anyone to take any letter "out of
any post office. . . or which has been in any post office. . . before it has been delivered to
the person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, or to pry
into the business or secrets of another. . . ." 255 F.2d at 881. Similarly, the court did not
find that 18 U.S.C. § 1703(a) was violated since detention alone, without proof that it was
for an unlawful purpose, is not sufficient to constitute a violation. Id at 881-82.
44. 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
45. The Court stated that the postal regulations do not permit an examination into sealed
1978]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
examination and inspection, except as to their outwardform and weight, as
if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domi-
ciles. The Constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure
in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their
papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.
4 6
The Costello court concluded that since only the outside of Costello's
mail had been inspected and no piece of mail had been removed from
the post office or delayed more than one delivery, writing appearing on
the outside of envelopes could be read and used without offense to the
Constitution or federal statutes.4 7
Eight years after Costello was decided, in Canaday v. United States,4 s
a defendant appealed his conviction for tax evasion on several grounds.
He alleged that a mail cover constituted an illegal tampering with and
delay in the delivery of his mail and an invasion of his privacy.49 The
Eighth Circuit relied primarily on United States v. Costello50 in uphold-
ing the validity of the mail cover on Canaday. It found that the mail
cover did not involve tampering or delay of defendant's mail. Further,
it dismissed the privacy argument, deeming it unnecessary to reiterate
the reasons for concluding that the mail cover was not a violation of
defendant's rights. 1
The Ninth Circuit first dealt with the mail cover issue in two 1967
cases, Cohen v. United States 2 and Lustiger v. United States." Both
cases involved objections to mail covers based upon alleged violations
of postal statutes.14 In Cohen, the defendant was convicted of "know-
ing utilization of interstate telephone facilities for the transmission of
wagers and wagering information."' 5" One of defendant's assertions on
appeal was that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained by a mail cover which allegedly violated the postal
packages subject to letter postage, but do permit it in the search for "prohibited matter"
upon "evidence of their violations obtained in other ways." Id at 735.
46. Id at 733 (emphasis added).
47. 255 F.2d at 881.
48. 354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1966).
49. Canaday also asserted that an IRS agent was not a proper party to receive informa-
tion acquired by the mail cover. In dismissing this argument, the court cited United States v.
Schwartz, 283 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 942 (1961), which held that
postal regulations do not prohibit transmittal of "mail watch" information from postmaster
to postal inspector to prosecuting authorities. 354 F.2d at 856.
50. 255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958).
51. 354 F.2d at 856-57.
52. 378 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 897 (1967).
53. 386 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1967), cer. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
54. The objections were based upon 18 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1703 (1976). See note 43 supra.
55. 378 F.2d at 754.
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statutes. Defendant contended that IRS agents were familiar with the
contents of correspondence subjected to the mail cover and thus con-
cluded that his first-class mail had been tampered with. The Ninth Cir-
cuit agreed with the district court finding that defendant's allegations
consisted of "generalizations and blanket charges," and found that the
evidence adequately supported the government's contention that the
mail cover had been properly conducted. Relying on Canaday,
56
United States v. Schwartz, 7 and Costello, 8 the Cohen court concluded
that the mail cover in Cohen did not violate the pertinent postal stat-
utes.59
Lustiger v. United States was important to the holding in Choate be-
cause, in addition to alleging violations of the postal statutes and regu-
lations, the defendant also contended that the mail cover procedure
itself was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth
amendment. Lustiger was convicted of mail fraud for engaging in a
scheme to sell Arizona land through deceptive fact sheets and
brochures circulated through the mails. The mail cover was used by
the government to obtain proof of the defendant's misuse of the mails
by ascertaining the names of Lustiger's defrauded customers. With lit-
tle discussion, the Ninth Circuit found that the kind of mail cover con-
ducted in the Lustiger case did not violate the postal statutes or
regulations.6 0 Apparently it was reasonable under the statutes since the
criminal charge directly related to the use of the mails.
6'
In addressing Lustiger's fourth amendment argument, the Ninth Cir-
cuit relied on earlier cases which had held that the opening of first-class
mail was a constitutional violation.62 Since no piece of Lustiger's mail
had been opened, the cases involving the opening of mail were inappli-
cable and the court held that the mail cover was not an unreasonable
search and seizure. It was, therefore, settled in the Ninth Circuit by
Lustiger that while first-class mail cannot be opened and searched or
56. 354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1966).
57. 283 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 942 (1961).
58. 255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958).
59. 378 F.2d at 760.
60. 386 F.2d at 139.
61. Although the court in Lustiger did not expressly state this reasoning, Judge Hufstedler
noted in her partial dissent to Choate that a post office mail cover conducted on a person
suspected of mail fraud is to be distinguished from the use of a mail cover to discover evi-
dence of a crime unrelated to the use of the mails. 576 F.2d at 196 n.46 (Hufstedler, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
62. The court relied on Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878), discussed in notes 44-46
supra and accompanying text, and Oliver v. United States, 239 F.2d 818, 820-21 (8th Cir.
1957) (warrantless opening of a package sent by first-class mail constitutes an illegal search
and seizure).
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seized and retained without a search warrant, the fourth amendment
does not preclude postal inspectors from copying information con-
tained on the outside of such mail.
63
In Choate, the majority relied heavily on Lustiger to conclude that
the fourth amendment does not prohibit the use of mail covers.' How-
ever, Judge Hufstedler did not believe herself bound by the prior Ninth
Circuit decision since "Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been
transformed since Lustiger was decided by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Katz v. United States... and its spawn. ' 65 In Katz, the de-
fendant made a telephone call from a closed phone booth. He was
subsequently convicted of transmitting wagering information by tele-
phone on the basis of evidence obtained through an electronic listening
device attached to the outside of the booth. In its landmark decision,
the Supreme Court rejected the traditional theory that fourth amend-
ment protections are limited to "constitutionally-protected areas."" It
held instead that the fourth amendment protects that which one seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public. 67 The
Court found that Katz had sought privacy and demonstrated a reason-
able expectation that it would be preserved when he entered the phone
booth and closed the door behind him.
Thus, after Katz, if an addressee has an expectation that information
on the outside cover of incoming mail will remain private and if such
an expectation is reasonable, a mail cover conducted without a search
warrant is a violation of the fourth amendment unless it falls within an
exception to the warrant requirement.68 Although the majority applied
the Katz criteria in determining whether the mail cover constituted a
search, it did not find the required privacy expectations to be present.
63. 386 F.2d at 139. The court stated: "[T]he fourth amendment does not preclude postal
inspectors from copying information contained on the outside of sealed envelopes in the
mail, where there is no substantial delay in the delivery of the mail involved." Id (citation
omitted). This implies that had defendant's mail been substantially delayed, the mail cover
would have violated the applicable postal statutes. It is implicit that a due process violation
of the fifth amendment would result. See also United States v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp. 743
(N.D. IlM. 1972). Isaacs, a post-Katz case, upheld the mail cover procedure based on pre-
Katz authority (see notes 43 through 63 supra and accompanying text for discussion of pre-
Katz cases). The defendant, former Seventh Circuit Judge Otto Kerner, Jr., also raised a
fourth amendment argument. The district court found that an examination of the rationale
of Katz did not indicate that mail cover operations were unconstitutional. 347 F. Supp. at
750.
64. 576 F.2d at 174-80.
65. Id at 196 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
66. 389 U.S. at 350. "Mhe Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Id at 351.
67. Id at 351-52.
68. See notes 74-76 infra and accompanying text.
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2. Does the Mail Cover Procedure Constitute a Search Within the
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?
Procedurally, the term "search" implies an exploratory investigation
or invasion with a view to discovering contraband or some other evi-
dence of guilt to be used in the prosecution of a criminal action.
69
Since the postal regulations authorize a mail cover for the purpose of
"obtaining evidence of commission or attempted commission of a
crime,"' 70 it would appear that the mail cover procedure is an explora-
tory investigation that falls within the meaning of a search.
When a search is necessary, the Supreme Court has made quite clear
what the fourth amendment requires:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it
is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing
the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a
judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or
seizure in light of the particular circumstances. 7
The Supreme Court stated in Aguilar v. Texas72 that
[t]he point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zeal-
ous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection con-
sists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and de-
tached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.73
However, there are certain circumstances that present an exception to
the warrant requirement so that a search and seizure does not violate
constitutional principles despite the absence of a warrant.74 Such situa-
69. 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 1 (1952).
70. 39 C.F.R. § 233.2(c)(1)(iii) (1977).
71. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (although the procedure for obtaining a warrant
cannot be followed when swift action based upon on-the-spot observations of an officer is
necessary, a search based on nothing more substantial than an unarticulated hunch intrudes
upon constitutionally protected rights).
72. 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (search warrant invalid when magistrate fails to perform in a
neutral and detached manner but serves merely as a "rubber stamp" for police).
73. Id at 111 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947) (question of when the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a law enforcement agent)). See also United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (the executive branch of government may not authorize elec-
tronic surveillance for domestic security purposes without a warrant); Zweibon v. Mitchell,
516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (warrantless wiretap on
domestic organization authorized by Attorney General for domestic security purposes is not
permissible and would be equally impermissible even if installed under presidential direc-
tive).
74. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (hot pursuit); Alimeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (search incident to border crossing); Coolidge v. New
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tions are supported by valid consent7" or by probable cause and exigent
circumstances.76
The majority in Choate had some question as to whether the mail
cover procedure constitutes a search but, for purposes of analysis, as-
sumed that a search was involved.77 The court concluded that fourth
amendment protections of a person's papers and effects apply only to
the warrantless opening of sealed mail and not, as here, to information
in plain view,78 since that which is in plain view is generally not consid-
ered to be the subject of a search.79 In support of the application of the
plain view doctrine to the mail cover on Choate, the court cited its
opinion in United Stales v. Solis:8° "generally evidence acquired by un-
aided human senses from without a protected area is not considered an
illegal invasion of privacy, but is usable under doctrines of plain view
or open view or the equivalent."'"
The application of the plain view doctrine to mail in the custody of
the post office appears inappropriate for two reasons.82 First, it is a
requirement of the doctrine that the evidence seized be of a character
by which "it is immediately apparent to police that they have evidence
before them."8 3 Absent facts that would support the issuance of a
search warrant, the information on the front of an envelope would
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (seizure of items in plain view); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970) (vehicle search); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to
arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (limited search incident to investigative detention);
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (exigent circumstances).
75. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to search may not be result
of express or implied duress or coercion); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)
(probable cause to conduct search not necessary when consent is freely and voluntarily
given).
76. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (the need to prevent destruction of evi-
dence when officers are in hot pursuit of suspect will justify a warrantless search); Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (exigent circumstances are absent when search con-
ducted a year after car impounded pursuant to invalid warrant); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1968) (exigencies of circumstances surrounding arrest justify only a search of the
area within immediate control of person arrested); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610
(1961) (inconvenience of officers and delay necessary to prepare papers will not justify war-
rantless search when destruction of evidence is not threatened).
77. 576 F.2d at 174.
78. Id
79. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
80. 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
81. Id at 881.
82. See Collins v. Wolff, 337 F. Supp. 114 (D. Neb. 1972), aft'd, 467 F.2d 359 (8th Cir.
1972) (plain view doctrine does not apply to mail in the custody of the Postal Service to
justify seizure of package the contents of which were revealed due to post office negligence).
83. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,466 (1971) (plain view doctrine inapplica-
ble to a car clearly visible to police who therefore seized it).
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rarely meet this requirement. Second, mail in the custody of the post
office cannot be considered to be "without a protected area" because of
the government's "monopolistic right to provide the public with mail
facilities." '84 Since a person has little alternative to using the United
States Postal Service, the federal government has established policies
protecting property and information in the custody of the post office
through the formulation of regulations and the enactment of statutes
governing employee conduct and the release of private information. 5
If the mail cover procedure is a search and the plain view exception
does not apply, fourth amendment search warrant requirements must
be met. In Choate, the mail cover request from the Bureau of Customs
agent investigating the defendant was approved not by an impartial,
objective magistrate, but by a postal inspector employed by a sister
governmental agency and unfamiliar with constitutional principles of
law. Thus, the inferences drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
that support a lawful search were not present. Further, even had prob-
able cause existed to cover Choate's mail,86 a thirty-day surveillance of
envelopes does not present the exigencies that would support dispens-
ing with a warrant.87
Even if viewed merely as an administrative procedure, a mail cover
authorized in the unchecked discretion of a postal inspector or his des-
ignee can be analogized to the warrantless administrative searches of
private property struck down in Camara v. Municipal Court88 and its
84. Oliver v. United States, 239 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1957) (plain view doctrine not
applicable when postal officials opened first-class package, discovered narcotics, resealed
package, and transmitted it for delivery to addressee who was arrested when he called for it).
See also National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Independent Postal System, 470 F.2d 265 (10th
Cir. 1972) (18 U.S.C. § 1696 and 39 U.S.C. §§ 601, 604 (controlling private express for let-
ters) reflect Congress' intent that the United States have a monopoly in the delivery of mail).
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976) (making it a felony for a Postal Service employee to
unlawfully detain, delay, or open mail in his possession); 18 U.S.C. §. 1709 (1976) (making it
a felony for a Postal Service employee to take any piece of mail or remove anything from
any piece of mail); 39 C.F.R. § 267.1 (1977) (Postal Service purpose and policy with respect
to protection of information); 39 C.F.R. § 268.1 (1977) (Postal Service employee rules of
conduct and consequences of noncompliance with respect to private information); 39 C.F.R.
§ 447.21 (1977) (standards of conduct for Postal Service Personnel).
86. Probable cause means reasonable cause to believe that the search will produce the
instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime. 68 AM. JUR. 2d Searches and
Seizures § 42 (1973).
87. In Choate's case, the requesting letter to the postal inspector in charge was dated July
19, 1972; the mail cover commenced on July 31, 1972. 576 F.2d at 168-69. See Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (when an exception to the warrant requirement is
sought, there must be a showing that exigent circumstances make searching without a war-
rant imperative); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (when speed is essential to
prevent endangering lives, escaping of suspect, or secreting of evidence, a warrantless search
is valid).
88. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In Camara, defendant was charged with violating the San Fran-
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companion case, See v. City of Seattle.89 In Camara and See, the
Supreme Court concluded that administrative searches of private prop-
erty without warrant are unreasonable even though routine inspection
of the physical condition of private property "is a less hostile intrusion
than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities
of crime."9 The Court reasoned that the purposes behind the warrant
machinery apply to protect the occupant subject to the search from the
unbridled discretion of the official in the field. 9'
It would appear that the mail cover procedure, although ostensibly
less intrusive than an administrative search, is also subject to the "un-
bridled discretion" of a postal inspector. While the mail cover seems
relatively benign, the potential for abuse by the official in the field may
bring it within the confines of the fourth amendment just as administra-
tive searches are now subject to those protections.
3. Even if the Mail Cover Procedure Does Not Constitute a Search
Per Se, is There Sufficient Abuse of the Device to
Implicate the Fourth Amendment?
Amici asserted on behalf of the defendant, that postal regulations
governing mail covers are inadequate to avoid systematic infringe-
ments of constitutionally protected rights.92 They pointed out that the
cover imposed on Choate's mail was just one of thousands of mail cov-
ers authorized by a procedure that is systematically abused by indis-
criminate requests and routinely granted authorizations.93 For
cisco Housing Code by refusing to permit city housing inspectors to make a warrantless
inspection of his quarters which allegedly violated the building's occupancy permit.
89. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). In See, defendant was convicted for refusing to allow a City of
Seattle Fire Department representative to inspect his locked commercial warehouse as part
of a routine, periodic city-wide canvass to obtain compliance with the fire code.
90. 387 U.S. at 530.
91. Id at 532. Even the executive branch of government may not authorize electronic
surveillance for domestic security purposes without a warrant. Such was the holding in
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), a case dismissed by the
Choate majority as inapt, although the analogy of electronic eavesdropping approved solely
by the executive branch to that of mail surveillance solely with the discretion of a postal
inspector appears appropriate. See also Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) which held that a warrantless wiretap on a domestic organi-
zation authorized by the Attorney General for domestic security purposes is not permissible,
and would be equally impermissible even if installed under presidential directive.
92. Brief for Committee for Public Justice and ACLU Foundation of Southern California
as amici curiae for defendant-Appellee at 5-7 [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee],
United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3311 (1978).
93. "In 1973-74, some 9,130 Postal Service 'mail covers' were in effect a total of 339,425
days, monitoring and recording postmarks, postage meter numbers, return addresses and
other data intercepted from private correspondence and transmitted to the requesting local
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example, congressional hearings revealed that "[ojf the approximately
48,000 mail covers requested in the years 1961-64, all but 70 were ap-
proved, '94 and from 1973 through the third quarter of 1975, only 450 of
the 13,479 mail covers requested were disapproved.9" Further, since no
federal law sanctions or regulates the use of mail covers, the general
citizenry is not aware of postal surveillance practices. This factor com-
pounds the detriment which may result from widespread misuse of the
procedure.96
The majority recognized that when mail covers are abused, the
fourth amendment may be implicated,97 but found no abuse surround-
ing the cover of Choate's mail. It believed that the hearings relied upon
by the defendant98 to prove such abuse of the mail cover procedure
instead supported the government's position that a mail cover falls
outside the protections of the fourth amendment.99 The court first
noted that "an established federal agency was requesting the mail cover
here, so that [defendant] cannot properly argue that this mail cover per-
state or federal law enforcement agency." Id at 4. The brief relied upon Hearings before the
Subcomna on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration ofJustice ofthe House Comm. on
the Judiciary (Surveillance), 94th Cong., 1st Sess..Part I, 232-35 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on Surveillance].
94. Brief for Appellee, supra note 92, at 5. The brief cited to Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Inva-
sions of Privacy (Governmental Agencies), 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on Invasions of Privacy].
95. 576 F.2d at 188 n.18 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting) citing Hearings before
the Subcomnt on Postal Facilities, Mail andLabor Management of the House Comm on Post
Office and Civil Service, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Judge Hufstedler stated: "Far from
being few in number, there were 4,528 other mail covers in effect during 1972 when Choate's
was requested and 5,171 in 1973." Id at 188 (citing Hearings on Surveillance, supra note
93).
96. 39 C.F.R. § 233.2(c)(4) (1977) defines "law enforcement agency" as "any authority of
the Federal Government or any authority of a State or local government one of whose func-
tions is to investigate the commission or attempted commission of acts constituting a crime."
Thus, "requests [for mail covers] have been honored from such entities as the U.S. Coast
Guard, the Department of Interior, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Depart-
ments of Labor, HEW, and Agriculture in addition to agencies more traditionally associated
with law enforcement." 576 F.2d at 188 n.16 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting)
(citing Hearings on Surveillance, supra note 93). While the postal regulations require the
requesting agency to specify reasonable grounds (39 C.F.R. § 233.2(d)(2)(ii) (1977)), "[t]he
meaning of reasonable grounds is undefined... and it appears that most requests are rou-
tinely granted if they seem to state reasons why a mail cover will prove helpful to the re-
questing agency." 576 F.2d at 188 (Hufstedler, I., concurring and dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
97. 576 F.2d at 177.
98. See notes 93 & 94 supra.
99. 576 F.2d at 178-79.
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mits snooping by obscure local agencies." 10" By this, the court implied
that the cover was justified because it was requested by a federal
agency of the magnitude of the Bureau of Customs, and not by some
little-known local agency. In addition, the majority attached great
weight to testimony before the Senate Hearings on Invasions of Pri-
vacy10 1 in which the Chief Postal Inspector testified that he trusted the
agencies requesting mail covers and did not believe they would do so
without good reason and some suspicion that a crime had been com-
mitted. The Chief Postal Inspector also testified that the Post Office
had received no complaints of mail cover abuses, and that he felt that
law enforcement agencies did not indiscriminately request mail cov-
ers. 10 2 The court also quoted from the Postmaster General's confiden-
tial instructions to postal inspectors relating to mail covers which
emphasized the importance of avoiding indiscriminate use of the proce-
dure.10 3 In light of this evidence, the majority felt that there were suffi-
cient precautions within the Postal Service system to avoid abuse of the
mail cover procedure.1' 4
Although the majority, implied that .a mail cover may be justified
when requested by an "established federal agency,"'1 the fourth
amendment does not distinguish between large federal agencies and
small local ones where governmental intrusion is prohibited."16 While
Postal Service policy appears to provide precautions against abuse, this
may be insufficient when the privacy rights of large numbers of people
are potentially affected. Thus, the general law enforcement use of the
mail cover device may constitute widespread governmental intrusion
offensive to the fourth amendment.
C. Does a Mail Cover Intrude Upon Any Privacy Interest Protected
by the Fourth Amendment?
Since Katz v. United States,"7 a governmental intrusion upon indi-
vidual privacy rights is unreasonable under the fourth amendment
100. Id at 178.
101. Hearings on Invasions of Privacy, supra note 94.
102. Id
103. 576 F.2d at 179.
104. Id at 179-80.
105. Id at 178.
106. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) (racial discrimination practiced by
county deputy voting registrar is just as violative of the federal constitution as if practiced by
the state's highest official); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (discrimination practiced by a
state governor and legislature is just as violative of federal law as if practiced by federal
officials).
107. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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where an individual exhibits an expectation of privacy, and when such
expectation is one which society recognizes as reasonable. 10 8 The
Choate majority, in applying the criteria of Katz, held that no privacy
rights had been violated by the mail cover.
10 9
1. The Sender's Privacy Right
Amici argued that the mail cover procedure violated not only de-
fendant's privacy rights, but those of senders as well." 0 The court
found senders' rights were not in issue because "only the senders would
be entitled to raise any question as to the intrusion into their Fourth
Amendment rights. . . .And none of them has complained.""' The
majority reiterated that, pursuant to the criteria set forth in Katz,"I2 the
fourth amendment only bars intrusion upon a person's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.' Since names and addresses were foreseeably
available to postal employees looking at the outside of the mail, the
court held that the sender had waived any claim to privacy." 4 Thus,
the mail cover would not have violated his "reasonable expecta-
tions."' 15
The only case in which a sender has alleged a constitutional violation
resulting from a mail cover is the 1975 case of Paton v. La Prade."6
There, sixteen-year-old Lori Paton, doing research for a high school
political theory class, sent a letter intended for the Socialist Labor Party
but addressed to the Socialist Workers' Party, upon which a mail cover
was in effect." 7 From information thus received, the FBI began an
investigation of Lori and her parents, which included an interview with
the local police chief and the principal and vice-principal of her high
school." 8 Although she was ultimately cleared of any wrongdoing, the
permanent FBI file on Lori presented an obstacle to her future. She
sued the FBI agents responsible pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1702119
108. Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
109. 576 F.2d at 176, 180.
110. Id. at 177.
111. Id at 178. Presumably, there was no need for any of Choate's correspondents to
complain since the information obtained from the mail cover did not lead to a governmental
investigation of any sender. Such a situation did occur in Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862,
873 (3d Cir. 1975) discussed in note 116 infra and accompanying text.
112. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
113. 576 F.2d at 174-75.
114. Id at 177.
115. Id
116. 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975).
117. Id at 865.
118. Id at 865-66.
119. 18 U.S.C. -§ 1702 (1976) provides in part:
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and 42 U.S.C. section 1983120 for damages and an injunction ordering
the file destroyed. 12 1 Owing to the inadequacy of the factual record,
the Third Circuit was unable to resolve the question of the constitution-
ality of the mail cover procedure. 22 The court did, however, determine
that plaintiff had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the pos-
tal regulation authorizing mail covers "since she may have sustained or
be immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of [the
mail cover and the FBI field investigation and file]."' 23 The Choate
majority, however, distinguished Paton on the ground that it involved a
mixup occurring from human error, and there had been no such asser-
tion in the Choate case.
124
Despite the Choate majority's conclusion, it appears not only reason-
able, but logical for a sender to expect that his name and return address
will be used by post office personnel for post office-related purposes
only. He places his name and address on the outside of the mail to
ensure against its loss or delivery to a dead-letter area when it is other-
wise undeliverable. In this connection, all data is placed on the envel-
ope for the convenience of the post office. 125 It is reasonably to be
anticipated that such information will be used solely to aid the Postal
Service in performing its functions and duties. An expectation that in-
formation on the front of an envelope will be used to launch a govern-
mental investigation of either the sender or the addressee is neither
reasonable nor foreseeable.
In addition, the majority's holding that only a sender would have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a mail cover is subject to
Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post office or any author-
ized depository for mail matter. . . before it has been delivered to the person to whom
it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, or to pry into the business
or secrets of another,. . . shall be fined not more than $2000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
Plaintiff asked for certification as a class action and demanded a declaratory judgment that
mail surveillance violated not only the above statute, but the first amendment as well. 524
F.2d at 866.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage
...subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
.to the deprivation of any rights, powers, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other
proper proceeding for redress.
121. 524 F.2d at 866-67.
122. Id at 872.
123. Id at 873.
124. 576 F.2d at 180.
125. The Postal Service requires use of return addresses by the senders in order "to enable




limitation.'26 Normally a party claiming a constitutional violation
must assert his own rights and not those of others. 27 But exceptions to
this rule are recognized where (1) the one asserting the non-party's
rights has been injured, (2) there is a close connection between the liti-
gant and the purpose of the conduct being challenged, and (3) the con-
stitutional rights of the non-party would be impaired since he has no
effective way to preserve them himself.12 Choate should, therefore,
have standing to assert the senders' rights since evidence obtained by
the allegedly unconstitutional procedure was used to indict him, the
relationship between him and the government's action was direct, and
it would be impractical for Choate's correspondents to raise the inva-
sion of their privacy rights when a mail cover had not been used
against them.
2. The Addressee's Privacy Right
In determining that the mail cover did not present a threat to
Choate's privacy, the court found that any privacy claims were waived
by the senders when they placed their names and addresses on the
mail. 129 Such a finding appears inconsistent in light of the fact that a
sender was not making a constitutional claim in the first instance.
Since it was the recipient's privacy right at issue, a discussion as to the
propriety of the senders' waiver of the addressee's fourth amendment
rights was clearly required, but absent from the opinion.
1 30
126. 576 F.2d at 178.
127. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-21 (1960). In Raines, the district court's
holding that an act of Congress was unconstitutional because it enjoined the action of pri-
vate parties was reversed on the ground that one who attacks the validity of a statute cannot
do so on the basis of its impact on other persons. There, public officials rather than private
parties had challenged the statute.
128. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-56, 257, 259 (1953). The Court allowed a
caucasian standing to defend an action which was brought seeking enforcement of a restric-
tive covenant against non-caucasians. Defendant prevailed because:
1) she could enter a direct injury in that she had been sued for $11,600 in damages;
2) there was a close relation between the purpose of the restrictive covenant and de-
fendant's possible securing loss, and
3) it would have been "difficult if not impossible" for defendant to have presented her
"grievances before any court." Id at 257.
In addition, the Court noted that defendant was "the only effective adversary of the cove-
nant in its last stand." Id at 259.
129. 576 F.2d at 177. The untenable position taken by the majority can best be illustrated
with a rhetorical question: If the postal inspector in charge had personally contacted one of
Choate's correspondents to obtain permission to copy information on the front of any envel-
ope addressed to Choate from that correspondent for the purpose of obtaining criminal evi-
dence against Choate, would the correspondent's permission waive Choate's constitutional
rights?
130. Presumably, it was not necessary for the court to address a due process violation
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
Effective consent for a warrantless search may be given by any "third
party who possesses common authority or other sufficient relationship
to the. . effects sought to be inspected.""'' The majority accepted de-
fendant's concession that the letters, prior to their delivery to him, were
still under the legal control of the senders. 32 Thus, the senders could
have no such common authority sufficient to justify consent to a waiver
of Choate's privacy rights. If the deposit in the mail of letters ad-
dressed to Choate constituted some other sufficient relationship which
permitted the senders to impliedly consent to a cover search of Choate's
mail, the waiver of Choate's fourth amendment rights still cannot be
supported. The senders did not know that a mail cover was in effect
and, therefore could not knowingly consent. The cases upholding
third-party consents make it clear that the third party knew that to
which he was consenting.' 33 At most, any implied consent imputed to
since defendant conceded that the mail cover information derived from an inspection of
mail still under the senders' control. 576 F.2d at 174. One rationale for the court's finding is
based on the theory that the addressee's rights in the mail had not yet attached at the time
the postal employees intercepted the letters for recordation. This theory is rooted in the rule
of contract acceptance stating that the sender of an acceptance by mail retains legal control
over it until it reaches the addressee. Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp.
417, 419 (Ct. Cl. 1955). The minority rule of contract acceptance (and California's state
policy) that acceptance becomes effective upon posting is expressed in Palo Alto Town &
Country Village, Inc. v. BBTC Co., 11 Cal. 3d 494, 497, 521 P.2d 1097, 1098 113 Cal. Rptr.
705, 706 (1974). Under this view, a sender relinquishes legal control of the letter at the time
it is deposited in the mail. Further support for the theory that a sender does not retain legal
control of a letter deposited in the mail is found in copyright law: "[Tlhe general rule is that
the author of a letter retains the ownership of the copyright or literary property contained
therein while the recipient of the letter acquires ownership of the tangible physical property
of the letter itself. . . The recipient of a letter has the absolute right either to destroy it, or
preserve it and permit its limited inspection by others. 1 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 5.04
(1978). See also Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912).
131. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). But V.c, Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483 (1964). In Stoner, officers conducted a warrantless search of defendant's hotel
room without his consent, but with the permission of the night clerk. The Court held that
the consent of the clerk did not render the search lawful-'t]hat [fourth amendment] pro-
tection would disappear if it were left to depend upon the unfettered discretion of an em-
ployee of the hotel." Id at 490. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Stewart said: "It is
important to bear in mind that it was the petitioner's constitutional right which was at stake
here, and not the night clerk's nor the hotel's. It was a right, therefore, which only the
petitioner could waive by word or deed, either directly or through an agent." Id at 489. See
also United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
132. 576 F.2d at 174. See also note 130, supra.
133. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (co-occupant of bedroom allowed po-
lice to search in defendant's absence); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)
(wife spontaneously gave husband's belongings to police in a good-faith effort to clear him);
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (joint user of a duffel bag allowed police to search the
bag).
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the senders applies only to the perusal of the front of envelopes for the
purpose of delivering the mail.
a. Post-Katz Circuit Court Decisions
In holding that a mail cover does not violate an addressee's fourth
amendment rights since any expectation of privacy is not reasonable,
the Choate court cited several post-Katz decisions discussing the pri-
vacy issue relating to mail covers. Although these cases did not find
mail covers to be invalid, each presented a fact situation clearly distin-
guishable from the facts in Choate.
In United States v. Balistrieri,13 4 defendant was convicted on two
counts of tax evasion. On appeal, he attacked the adequacy of the gov-
ernment's evidence claiming it was obtained through illegal electronic
surveillance and mail cover. The primary issue was whether the gov-
ernment had sustained its burden of proof that the evidence thus ob-
tained was free from the taint of the original illegality. Since the court
determined that the government met its burden by showing that infor-
mation acquired by electronic surveillance and mail cover had been
independently obtained prior to the use of those sources, the Seventh
Circuit was not required to reach the question of whether the mail
cover illegally interfered with the defendant's privacy rights. Thus,
rather than support the Choate holding that no privacy interest attaches
to the exterior of one's mail, the Balistrieri court implied that the mail
cover was in fact an illegal search and seizure: "We hold that the evi-
dence relating to Midwest [a corporation whose address was the same
as defendant's] was not 'come at by explpitation' of the information
obtained in the illegal searches and seizures ....
In the Second Circuit case of United States v. Leonard,1 36 the New
York regional office of the IRS had become concerned over possible
losses of tax revenue through the use of Swiss bank accounts. It was
suggested that taxpayers having such accounts might be identified by
their receipt of statements from the Swiss banks. In the interest of se-
crecy, however, the banks used envelopes not bearing a return name or
address. Agents acquired the postage meter numbers of the banks and
requested that the Postal Service conduct a mail cover of all air mail
letters lacking return addresses mailed from Switzerland to New York
and bearing the relevant meter numbers. Leonard was one of the ad-
dressees whose name was thus discovered, and although he was already
134. 403 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971).
135. Id at 476.
136. 524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976).
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under IRS investigation, the government attempted to use mail cover
evidence at his trial to show that he had lied in executing an affidavit
stating he had no foreign accounts. As to the mail cover, Leonard's
attack on appeal centered around the contention that it was an unrea-
sonable search in violation of the fourth amendment.
Judge Friendly recognized that subsequent to Katz there was an in-
creased concern for the protection of privacy. He conceded that the
Second Circuit's prior statement in United States v. Costello'37 was that
writing appearing on the outer cover of mail may be read and used
without offense to the Constitution. But, he suggested that the prior
holding "should not be read as an absolute, permitting, for example,
the Government to copy the outside of every envelope received by
every citizen."1 38 Thus, Judge Friendly implied that there could con-
ceivably be circumstances surrounding a mail cover that would violate
the fourth amendment. He did not, however, find the Leonard case to
be an appropriate candidate for creating an exception to the prevailing
view that mail covers are constitutional. The Leonard court relied on
United States v. Odland,39 a Seventh Circuit case which held that there
could be no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to incoming
international mail which is subject to inspection pursuant to customs
regulations."4 Since customs laws permit international mail to be in-
spected without violation of the fourth amendment, and since the mail
cover in Leonard merely turned up information required by the Bank
Secrecy Act-sustained as constitutional in Caifornia Bankers Ass'n v.
Schultzl4 -- the Leonard court could not find the mail cover there of-
fensive to the fourth amendment.
The facts in Leonard are easily distinguished from those of Choate,
making its authority for the Choate holding questionable. The infor-
mation produced by the mail cover on the domestic mail of Choate
could not have been used to aid in the enforcement of customs laws. 142
Further, no federal law similar in purpose to the Bank Secrecy Act
mandates disclosure of the kind of information revealed by the surveil-
lance of domestic mail.
In United States v. Bianco,143 the defendant was convicted for failure
to file tax returns. On appeal, he challenged admission of evidence de-
137. 255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958).
138. 524 F.2d at 1087.
139. 502 F.2d 148 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1088 (1974).
140. Id at 150.
141. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
142. The mail cover on Choate was originally requested by the Federal Bureau of Cus-
toms but later used by the IRS to obtain evidence for his tax evasion indictment.
143. 534 F.2d 501 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 822 (1976).
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rived from a mail cover, although he had not raised the objection at
trial nor had he moved to suppress the evidence, claiming it would
have been futile to do so. He maintained that United States v.
Leonard, 44decided after his trial, changed the law with respect to the
constitutionality of mail covers. Defendant referred specifically to
Judge Friendly's dicta in Leonard that although writing appearing on
the face of envelopes may be copied and used by the government with-
out offense to the Constitution, increased concerns for privacy interests
may preclude the government from copying all envelopes received by
all citizens.1 45 The Second Circuit held that Bianco's claim could not
be raised on appeal.'" The Bianco court nevertheless created its own
dicta by interpreting Judge Friendly's statement to mean that "any par-
ticular investigative means, including mail covers, are subject to abuse
and excesses, and . . . such excesses might serve to distinguish this
Court's prior decision that the reading of the outside of an envelope
does not violate any constitutional principles."
147
Bianco is weak authority for the Choate holding, since in Bianco the
issue as to the expectation of privacy with respect to the surface of de-
fendant's mail was not faced at all. Rather, the language there implies
that under appropriate circumstances, a mail cover could be found to
be an unreasonable invasion of privacy.
b. Analogous Supreme Court Cases
The Choate court acknowledged that the case before it was the "first
post-Katz situation where the constitutionality of the mail cover device
has been squarely presented in a manner requiring extended analy-
sis, '' 14 1 and noted that the Supreme Court has never directly passed on
the constitutionality of mail covers. It analogized to three Supreme
Court decisions to support its finding that the Court would hold mail
covers constitutional.
In United States v. Miller,149 the defendant, charged with various
federal offenses, made a pretrial motion to suppress microfilms of
checks, deposit slips, and other records maintained by the bank in ac-
144. 524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 956 (1976).
145. Id. at 1087.
146. The Second Circuit invoked the rule announced in United States v. Indiviglio, 352
F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1965) (en banc), cer. denied, 383 U.S. 907 (1966), holding that the failure
to make proper objection before the trial court to the admission of challenged evidence
forecloses review of the asserted error on appeal.
147. 534 F.2d at 508.
148. 576 F.2d at 175.
149. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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cordance with a provision of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 and ob-
tained pursuant to a defective search warrant. In deciding that a search
warrant was not required to obtain the records, the Supreme Court
held that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in
the ordinary course of business.'
50
While the Choate majority analogized a depositor's privacy right to
that of an addressee, such a comparison appears inapposite. A deposi-
tor voluntarily reveals to his bank information which he expects will be
recorded by bank personnel. Although an addressee may expect that
information appearing on the front of his letters will be used to deliver
the mail, he does not expect such information to be recorded. Further,
an addressee does not voluntarily reveal information on the surface of
his mail to postal authorities because he has little control over those
who send him mail and does not know what will be received, when, or
from whom. In dissent, Judge Hufstedler correctly pointed out that
since mail is surreptitiously examined before it reaches the addressee,
he does not know that the information collected even exists.15 1 There-
fore, even if arguendo the use of the United States mails constitutes a
form of consent to record the data on the front of mail, such consent
cannot be knowingly given.
In United States v. Santana,'52 defendant was arrested without war-
rant in the vestibule of her home after officers observed her at the
threshold. The Supreme Court held that her fourth amendment rights
were not violated since she exhibited no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy when she knowingly exposed herself to public view at the door of
her home. The Choate court equated the threshold of a home to the
outside of a letter; however, Santana correctly applies where the war-
rantless arrest or seizure takes place in an area openly visible to public
observation at all times.'53 The front doorway of a house is exposed to
public view twenty-four hours a day and a person wishing to maintain
privacy as to certain acts remains indoors. An envelope is not exposed
to public view at all-only to the limited view of postal employees. An
150. For a critical view of the holding in Miller, see Note, Is There a Right ofPrivacy in
Bank Records? Different Answers to the Same Question: California vs. Federal Law, 10 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 378 (1977).
151. 576 F.2d at 205 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
152. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
153. See United States v. Cantu, 557 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1236
(1978) (evidence collected in open parking lot of restaurant not illegally seized); United
States v. Edwards, 539 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 989 (1976) (warrantless
arrest on public highway openly visible to observation permissible).
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addressee desiring that the information on the front of his mail not be
revealed to postal authorities does not have the option of removing his
mail from the purview of the post office.
In concluding that a mail cover is not unreasonable within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment, the court applied the facts and holding of
United States v. Van Leeuwen 54 where the detention of mail for the
purpose of obtaining a search warrant was reasonable in light of appro-
priate reasons given by the requesting agency. In Van Leeuwen, cus-
toms officials suspected that packages mailed by defendants contained
contraband and delayed the routing of the packages while authorities
obtained search warrants. The Supreme Court did not find that the
detention of the packages 155 constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure under the circumstances. The suspicious nature of the mailings
justified the delay in order to obtain warrants, and under such circum-
stances "even first-class mail is not beyond the reach of all inspection;
and the sole question here is whether the conditions for its detention
and inspection had been satisfied."' 56
In terms of time, per Van Leeuwen, up to twenty-nine hours is not a
sufficient detention to constitute an unreasonable search where proba-
ble cause exists for believing the mail part of an illicit scheme and
where, at the end of the period of detention, a search warrant issues.
Admittedly, the five or ten minute delay necessary to record the infor-
mation required by a mail cover is not an unreasonable detention ei-
ther. However, the analogy to Van Leeuwen appears inappropriate,
since it was not suspected that letters and packages sent to Choate con-
tained contraband, 57 nor was a warrant being requested. In Van
Leeuwen, the packages themselves were suspicious. In this mail cover
situation, there was no probable cause to suspect the contents of the
incoming mail to be criminal evidence.
The three Supreme Court opinions relied upon by the Choate major-
ity provide little support for the court's holding. Each case is easily
distinguishable. In one, the defendant should have been and actually
was aware that information voluntarily revealed was being recorded.
In another, the defendant exposed herself to authorities, although she
154. 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
155. One package was detained 1 1/2 hours; the other, 29 hours.
156. 397 U.S. at 252.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (suspicion that bulky enve-
lopes arriving from country known to be a source of heroin contain contraband justifies
warrantless search); United States v. Milroy, 538 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1976) (warrantless
search of envelopes permitted where officials knew specially trained dogs had sniffed them
out as containing narcotics and each envelope felt like it contained more than a letter).
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clearly had an option not to do so. In the third, mail was suspicious on
its face, so delay for purposes of obtaining a search warrant was reason-
able. In Choate, the defendant did not expect information on the sur-
face of his mail to be recorded; he could not have avoided exposing this
information to postal authorities in any event since he had no other
option but to use (nor could he control his senders' use of) the United
States Postal Service; his mail was not suspicious on its face.
United States v. New York Telephone Co.,"' in which a pen regis-
ter159 was held to constitute a search, 160 provides a more appropriate
analogy. Although the majority did not address this opinion, the dis-
sent aptly noted that a pen register, which records that a call was made
to a particular number, is less intrusive than a mail cover which reveals
that a piece of mail was actually sent and from whom it was re-
ceived. 161 Like a pen register which for purposes of analogy can be
termed a phone cover,162 "a mail cover intrudes into a channel of com-
158. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
159. "A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a tele-
phone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is re-
leased. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are
actually completed." Id at 161 n.l.
160. In the United States v. New York Tel Co. case, a district court had issued an order
authorizing the FBI to install and use pen registers with respect to two telephones and di-
recting the telephone company to furnish the information, facilities, and technical assistance
necessary. The telephone company declined to comply fully with the order and moved in
the district court to vacate the portion of the order affecting the company on the ground that
such a directive could be issued only in connection with a wiretap order conforming to Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (1976)). The district court ruled that pen registers are not governed by the
proscriptions of Title III because they are not devices used to intercept oral communications
and that it had jurisdiction pursuant to the All Writs Act (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1976)) to order the company to assist in the installation of pen registers. On appeal the
Second Circuit held that a pen register involves a search and seizure under the fourth
amendment and a court may issue such an order on a showing of probable cause, but that
the district court lacked power to order the company, a third party, to tender assistance.
Application of United States in re Pen Register Order, 538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'dsub
nom. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977). The Supreme Court af-
firmed that use of a pen register constitutes a search subject to fourth amendment procedural
safeguards but held that the All Writs Act and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 were
broad enough to authorize the district court to order a third party to render technical assist-
ance.
161. 576 F.2d at 201 n.68 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
162. Although the court did not address the Supreme Court opinion in United States v.
New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), it did note the similarity between pen registers and
mail covers, and cited its opinion in Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254
(9th Cir. 1977) in which information obtained by a pen register was held not to be entitled to
fourth amendment protection. In Hodge, a telephone customer filed a civil suit against the
telephone company stemming from the company's installation of a pen register on his tele-
phone in connection with a telephone company investigation into obscene telephone calls.
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munication and seizes evidence of who is being communicated
with,"' 63 and is thus "similar to the seizure of intangibles in the wiretap
and bugging areas held within the scope of the Fourth Amendment."
164
Indeed, there is little difference between the surreptitious electronic re-
cording of a person's conversation with a bank receptionist that
reveals the identity of his bank, and the written record of the return
address on a bank statement delivered to an addressee that reveals
the same information. Yet, the discovery of such (and other private
information) now permissible without a warrant through use of a mail
cover, constitutes an illegal search and seizure when revealed through
warrantless wiretap.1 65 The New York Telephone Co. case presents a
more persuasive analogy to the mail cover in the instant case than any
of the Supreme Court cases considered analogous by the majority. The
court's conclusion, therefore, that the Supreme Court would uphold the
constitutionality of mail covers is strongly questionable.
The Hodge court stated some reservation that the requisite state action exists when a tele-
phone company installs a pen register device on its own initiative to investigate abuse of its
service (555 F.2d at 256 n.3). Assuming that state action does exist, the court concluded that
the fourth amendment is not implicated when the content of the communication is not re-
corded. It likened pen registers to telephone company billing records which were held not
entitled to fourth amendment protections in United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied 414 U.S. 801 (1973) and United States v. Fithian, 452 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1971)
which held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone company billing
records. Concurring in Hodge, Judge Hufstedler noted:
The decision in this case is a narrow one. We do not hold that information recorded by
pen registers is never entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. Rather, our holding
that the telephone company's use of a pen register to investigate obscene telephone calls
does not violate the Fourth Amendment is limited to the facts presented by this appeal.
We leave for another day a Fourth Amendment challenge to the telephone company's
installation of a pen register at the request of the Government to investigate a crime
that is unrelated to the delivery of telephone service.
555 F.2d at 267 (Hufstedler, J., concurring). The possibility that the fourth amendment
applies to the use of pen registers has been recognized in other circuits. See, e.g., United
States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir.), ceri. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975); United States v.
Falcone, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975). See also United
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
163. 576 F.2d at 201 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
164. Id, citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (conversations overheard
through electronic surveillance held illegally seized); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (same); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (the surreptitious recording of con-
versations for mere evidence held unconstitutional search); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963) (statements made by defendant at time of arrest and surreptitiously recorded
by officer held illegally seized).
165. See note 164 supra.
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IV. CONCLUSION
That a mail cover does not violate a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy is a holding worthy of Supreme Court review.' 66 A thirty-day
cover on a person's mail reveals a great deal of information ordinarily
kept private by the average citizen. In that period of time, a record of
return addresses on incoming letters reveals personal correspondents as
well as those connected with financial, educational, religious, political,
and property interests. 67 Moreover, as the dissent indicates, many of
those correspondents maintain files on the addressee which can be dis-
covered and used by an investigating agency, so that the information
gleaned from a mail cover used with other investigatory techniques
"quickly makes the subject's life an open book .... -161
The Ninth Circuit correctly evaluated the mail cover procedure in
accordance with the guidelines set forth in Katz, but did not find that
there is any expectation of privacy as to the outside cover of mail or
that such an expectation would be reasonable. It relied on Ex Parne
Jackson'69 which held that the fourth amendment protects against the
warrantless opening of sealed mail, and found that a mail cover merely
records information placed on the outside of letters and packages
which is in plain sight to postal employees and others, and which an
addressee could not, therefore, expect to keep private. Yet, it would
seem that the facts of Katz are closely analogous to a mail cover situa-
tion. Although Katz himself undoubtedly realized that he was visible
through the glass portion of the phone booth that was accessible to
public view, he had a reasonable expectation that the content of his
conversation and the identity of the person with whom he was commu-
nicating would remain private. Indeed, the Court held that the infor-
mation, discovered via electronic recordation, was illegally seized.
Similarly, while an addressee's name and address and the senders'
name and return address is clearly visible to postal workers, the record-
ing of that information for the purpose of discovering the nature of the
communication presents similar circumstances to the search and
seizure struck down as unconstitutional in Katz. Thus a reasonable
expectation that information appearing on the outer surface of mail
will remain private is clearly justified.
166. However, the Supreme Court apparently does not agree. United States v. Choate,
576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3311 (1978).
167. See note 11, supra.
168. 576 F.2d at 187 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
169. 96 U.S. 727 (1878). See also notes 44 & 45 supra, and accompanying text.
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The holding in United States v. Choate indicates a reluctance to ap-
ply the full import of Katz for the purpose of expanding individual
privacy rights and maintains the status quo throughout the circuits as
to the constitutionality of mail covers. While the language of Katz
could have supported a contrary result, the Ninth Circuit's more con-
servative approach does preserve an effective law enforcement tool.
Until the Supreme Court speaks on the subject, however, expanded use
of mail covers supported by this holding could conceivably lead to the
kinds of abuses dismissed in the opinion as "more ephemeral than
real,"1 70 but which present actual threats to individual privacy rights.
Doris Schaffer
170. 576 F.2d at 180.
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